34

Book Reviews

Sean M. Maloney. Operation Kinetic: Stabilizing Kosovo. Lincoln,
NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2018. Pp 512.
In the 1990s Canada was involved in three major operations in
Kosovo. The first was Operation Kimono from October 1998 to
March 1999 as part of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM).
The purpose of the KVM was to monitor the cease fire by the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and prevent further human rights
abuses towards Kosovo’s Albanian population. Operation Kimono
ended in March 1999 when human rights abuses continued despite
the KVM’s presence. Canada’s second major involvement in
Kosovo was through Operation Allied Force, a seventy-eight-day
air campaign from 24 March 1999 to 10 June 1999 against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia intended to force them to withdraw
from Kosovo and create peace in the region. The final major
involvement was Operation Kinetic between June 1999 and June
2000. Operation Kinetic was Canada’s contribution to NATO’s
peacekeeping force, Kosovo Force (KFOR), which operated inside
of Kosovo when the bombing campaign ended. In Operation
Kinetic: Stabilizing Kosovo, military historian Sean Maloney aims
to tell the story of Canada’s third and final major involvement
and mission in Kosovo as well as Canada’s contribution to the
overall stabilisation of Kosovo. It is meant to be an in-depth
examination of how the international community transitioned
from a small observer force, the KVM, to KFOR. However, the
book does not deal with Canada’s role in Operation Allied Force
(NATO’s seventy-eight-day air campaign). This sets Operation
Kinetic apart from other books on the Kosovo War.
Operation Kinetic comes in three parts. The first part,
“Background,” gives a “quick and dirty” primer on the Balkans
and tells the history of Kosovo starting in 1389 (p. 1). The aim
of this section is to help the reader understand the complexity of
Kosovo and the cause of Canada’s involvement. Part two, “Crisis in
Kosovo,” analyses the events and human rights abuses that led to
the international community’s involvement in Kosovo. The final part,
“Canada and KFOR Operations,” explains the operational context,
the tactical activities and, most importantly, the challenges faced by
the Canadian Forces.
In Operation Kinetic Maloney is highly critical of a number of
actors involved in the Kosovo War and the post-war stabilisation of
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Kosovo. On the failure of diplomatic negotiations to avoid war at the
Rambouillet Conference he asserts, “In the end the Kosovar Albanian
delegation remained as intransigent as the FRY [Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia] delegation” (p. 82). But the Kosovar Albanian delegation
signed the agreement presented and the FRY delegation did not. In
addition, Maloney refers to Canadian bureaucrats as “fear-filled” and
“skittish” (p. 374). Not surprisingly, he uses testimonies of soldiers
who are highly critical of bureaucrats, but he rarely attempts to offer
the historical and political context and there is no indication that
he tried to interview any of those he is critical of. Maloney also
criticises the Americans’ “serious confusion” about ground troops,
and attributes their mixed messages to an attempt to “contain
Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic, and Monica Lewinsky all at
the same time” (p. 64). He is highly critical of the media’s coverage of
the air war explaining that, “the war of perceptions and the air war
became indistinguishable, as commentators dissected the voice and
word usage of NATO spokespersons, attempted to decipher hidden
subliminal messages and facilitated Belgrade’s attempts to distort
reality for their purposes” [emphasis added] (p. 102). According to
Maloney, while the media was busy exaggerating the “miniscule”
number of collateral casualties from the air campaign, they were
neglecting to report on the buildup of KFOR. He concludes, “the
pessimism of the media commentators, however, could not compete
with the resolve and grim professional determination that resonated
throughout the NATO forces” (p.103). Again, there is no evidence of
any attempt by Maloney to present the media’s perspective or the
reasoning for their coverage. A recently published book by Canadian
historian Bob Bergen, Scattering Chaff: Canadian Air Power and
Censorship During the Kosovo War, challenges Maloney’s assertion
that the media alone was to blame for the lack of transparency during
the Kosovo War by explaining that despite attempts of journalists to
cover the Kosovo War fairly, their efforts were thwarted by restrictive
media policies of both NATO and the Canadian government.1
Maloney can be considered a “straight shooter,” but his biggest
problem is shooting at the wrong target. This is most evident when
he deals with the Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (UÇK), also known
as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Maloney repeatedly accuses
  Bob Bergen, Scattering Chaff: Canadian Air Power and Censorship During the
Kosovo War (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2019).
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the KLA of having connections, of all sorts, with al Qaeda and other
Islamic extremists. He states, “The lure of weapons training proved
too great for some young Kosovar Albanians, and a number made their
way to Taliban-dominated Afghanistan to train with the al Qaeda
terror network run by Osama bin Laden” (p. 41). The sole source for
this accusation is a confidential interview. While it is not uncommon
to use confidential interviews, other sources discredit Maloney’s
claim, most notably Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and
U.S. Intervention by David Phillips, a former diplomat and one of
the leading American experts on Kosovo. As Phillips explains,
Serbian propaganda tried to discredit the KLA by fabricating links to
Al Qaeda and other Islamic extremists. Media reports surfaced that
the KLA was being trained by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and that
Al Qaeda was providing funds. It is correct that Al Qaeda established
a network of charities in Albania...an Egyptian national did, in fact,
approach the KLA offering money and weapons on behalf of Al Qaeda;
however, the envoy was rebuffed. The KLA’s war of liberation was not
about religion. Foreign fighters saw Kosovo as an opportunity for holy
war, but Albanians were engaged in a struggle for national liberation.2

Thus, while Maloney criticises the media for facilitating Belgrade’s
attempts to distort reality for its own purposes, evidence suggests
he may be falling into the same trap twenty years later. As proof of
this, Maloney uses the instructions that came from Western nations
that individual advisors and freedom fighters from other states
should be withdrawn from Kosovo within thirty days. “It was time
for the mujaheddin to go home,” he says (p. 137). However, this is
more likely referring to Albanians from other countries who went to
Kosovo to fight in hopes of liberating their home country, such as the
“Atlantic Brigade” which consisted of fire fighters from the Bronx.
Phillips acknowledges that in 1998, twenty-two mujaheddin showed
up wanting to join the KLA. However, he explains that they were
largely wiped out in an accident before making it into Kosovo.3 It is
important to note, that some of the soldiers interviewed for Operation
Kinetic refer to the mujahedeen as well. This is unsurprising since,
   David L. Phillips, Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S Intervention
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2012), 70.
3
  Phillips, Liberating Kosovo.
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as has been acknowledged, this was a concern in both the media
and intelligence at the time. However, it is the responsibility of the
historian to both present memories and put them into historical
context, enlightening the facts.
In the third part of the book, Maloney is in his element when
writing about the details of Operation Kinetic and the structure of
the Canadian military. He illustrates the difficulties the Canadian
units overcame to become instrumental in preventing violence and
stabilising post-war Kosovo despite not being given their own sector.
The biggest strength of this book is the depth, vulnerability and
candidness of the recollections Maloney is able to obtain from his
interviewees. Soldiers reflect candidly on their fears: “it was quite
scary, especially at night. We had NVGs [night vision goggles],
but you can’t see jack shit” (p. 180); their triumphs: “it was like a
World War II movie, the Canadians going through Holland. It was a
terrific send-off” (p. 164), and their frustrations: “minute by minute
management by Ottawa [is] frustrating - call it tyranny of real time”
(p. 245). Soldiers also reflect on the toll of digging up mass graves,
working near hazardous material and working with so many other
countries, including Russia.
In his acknowledgments, Maloney laments that after the events
of 11 September 2001 and the wars that followed, “the Balkans had
seemingly become irrelevant, and publishers made that point clear”
(p. xvi). Though the blame does not lie solely with the publishers,
it is an unfortunate reality that Maloney’s assessment is right.
Unlike many historians, Maloney attempts to present adequate
historical background of Kosovo. However, this commendable effort is
complicated by the inaccuracies. It is when Maloney is in his element,
describing military operations, technologies and eliciting testimony
from soldiers that Operation Kinetic is the most useful. Despite some
setbacks, Operation Kinetic still represents a valuable contribution
to the field of Canada/Kosovo relations and the Kosovo War.
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